Reinventing and Reinterpreting Multilateralism from the Margins

Recent regional gatherings , from the SCO meeting in Tianjin to the Arab League summit in Baghdad , have dominated headlines, leaving vivid images of intense, visible diplomacy . In fact , mainstream media tend to exhibit an event-driven bias, privileging dramatic acts and decisive gestures over slow, procedural multilateralism. This bias makes regional actors appear to deliver rapid, tangible responses, while global institutions remain constrained by consensus and bureaucracy.

Beyond media perception, these dynamics reveal deeper divergences in diplomatic routines and hierarchies that shape how multilateralism is experienced across regions. This article argues that the so-called “crisis of multilateralism” does reflects not systematically its collapse, but its reconfiguration :  regionalized, plural, and normatively diverse.

Multilateralism as a Negotiated Norm

Rather than a fixed model, multilateralism can be understood as a social norm : an institutionalized form of cooperation based on shared rules and consensus. According to Finnemore and Sikkink , norms follow a life cycle: their emergence through norm entrepreneurs who challenge convention; their cascade after adoption by key states; and finally, their internalization, when they become routine and almost invisible. Once internalized, norms do not vanish , they are reinterpreted or renegotiated because regions adapt them to their political, cultural, or hierarchical contexts.

Beyond reinterpretation, contestation emerges as a separate dynamic: regional actors not only translate global norms into local practice but also contest and remake those norms by building complementary institutions. As Morse and Keohane  argue, this “contested multilateralism” is more about a redistribution of power rather than a rejection of cooperation.

Selective Multilateralism and Niche diplomacy in the Middle East

Regional organizations in the Middle East, such as the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), have historically struggled to produce lasting collective diplomacy. Rivalries, weak institutionalization, and the dominance of national agendas have limited integration, giving rise to a fragmented regionalism based on temporary coalitions and ad hoc coordination.

This is evident in recent initiatives. On 17 October 2025, Saudi Arabia’s Finance Minister announced that Riyadh was finalizing major investments for Syria’s post-war reconstruction , a move that bypasses traditional multilateral channels like the UN, IMF, or World Bank, often constrained by sanctions and bureaucracy. Similarly, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have positioned themselves as key players in Gaza’s reconstruction, using targeted investments as tools of influence and legitimacy.

These actions exemplify selective multilateralism: a pragmatic approach where regional powers recast cooperation through economic engagement rather than formal institutions. Gulf states like Saudi Arabia or the UAE pursue what we call niche diplomacy ; a targeted, issue-specific interventions in reconstruction, energy, and mediation that expand their influence while preserving strategic autonomy from broader multilateral frameworks. In order to illustrate a different approach to reinterpreting multilateralism in a completely distinct context, it can also be interesting to turn to Southeast Asia .

The “ASEAN Way” and Norm Localization in Southeast Asia

Founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) emerged not from ideology but from a pragmatic desire to prevent instability amid Cold War rivalries and postcolonial fragmentation.Stability in the region depends less on power than on socialization and shared norms: non-interference, consultation, and consensus. 

This distinctive diplomatic culture commonly called the “ASEAN Way” represents a collective learning process, emphasizing restraint and mutual respect rather than legalism or coercion. Global norms such as democracy, human rights, or multilateralism are consequently reinterpreted to align with local values of hierarchy and gradualism. Thus ,this localization of norms  produces hybrid forms of cooperation that are  neither purely Western nor fully alternative.

Divergent interpretations, as seen in debates over Myanmar or human rights, reflect temporary normative misalignments, not a structural crisis. For example , in October 2025, under Malaysian chairmanship, ASEAN was invited by the junta to send observers for the December elections in Myanmar and multiplied stakeholder engagement meetings with civil society. While multilateral mechanisms at the level of the UN or EU remain paralyzed, ASEAN’s adaptive diplomacy continues to fill the void.

As Singapore’s Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan remarked at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 5 August 2025 “We have a multilateral DNA, but there are partners that make more sense in this changing world. One term we are bantering with now is called flexible multilateralism.” This captures the region’s pragmatic reinterpretation of multilateralism that is more adaptive, inclusive, and rooted in local practice rather than universal design.

             Both regions display capacities for self-organization but follow different normative logics. On the one hand , Middle Eastern countries illustrate a form of selective, interest-driven multilateralism that is fast, visible and often led by wealthier states. On the other hand Southeast Asian countries adopt a consensus-based, socialized multilateralism that is slower but institutionally durable. These regional variations show that the “crisis” of multilateralism is neither uniform nor absolute: it is fragmented, contextual and often generative of new norms.

In conclusion , in order to put in perspective the crisis thesis ,  we can consider a plural, polycentric governance landscape . That doesn’t mean the multilateral order is safe , it remains at a critical juncture . However , we should distinguish between a deep fragmentation that weakens global governance and regional reconfigurations that rebuild legitimacy in different registers.

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